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Moral judgments play a critical role in motivating and enforcing human cooperation, and 
research on the proximate mechanisms of moral judgments highlights the importance of 
intuitive, automatic processes in forming such judgments. Intuitive moral judgments often 
share characteristics with deontological theories in normative ethics, which argue that certain 
acts (such as killing) are absolutely wrong, regardless of their consequences. Why do moral 
intuitions typically follow deontological prescriptions, as opposed to those of other ethical 
theories? Here we test a functional explanation for this phenomenon by investigating whether 
agents who express deontological moral judgments are more valued as social partners. Across 
five studies we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments are 
preferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in 
economic games. These findings provide empirical support for a partner choice account of why 
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Inference of trustworthiness from intuitive moral judgments 
 
Moral judgments are stitched into the fabric of human nature, steering us toward 
cooperation and away from exploitation. Research has highlighted a central role for intuitive, 
automatic cognitive processes in forming such judgments (Greene, 2014; Haidt, 2001). And 
intriguingly, such intuitive or automatic (and their counterpart, deliberate, or controlled) 
processes in moral judgment have been argued to align with two opposing perspectives 
dominating ethical discussion: deontology (Kant, 1797/2002; Scanlon, 1998) and 
consequentialism (Bentham, 1879/1983; Mill, 1863). Consequentialist theories like 
Utilitarianism focus solely on the impartial maximization of aggregate welfare as the criterion 
for a moral act: “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as 
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness” (Mill, 1863). In contrast, deontological theories 
hold that the rightness or wrongness of an action is not entirely dependent on its consequences, 
and instead typically focus on notions of duties, rights, and obligations. Inspired by this debate, 
researchers have explored how people respond to moral dilemmas with two options that align 
with either consequentialism (e.g., sacrificing a single innocent life to save many others) or 
deontology (e.g. refusing to sacrifice an innocent life regardless of the consequences). A wealth 
of behavioral and neurobiological evidence has shown that participants’ intuitive and automatic 
judgments tend to be characteristically deontological, while characteristically consequentialist 
judgments are often the result of slow, deliberative cognitive processes (Greene, 2007; Greene, 
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Koenigs et al., 2007). But it remains unclear 
why moral intuitions more often align with deontology, rather than the option that would 
maximize the utility of outcomes. This question is even more puzzling when one considers that 
deontological judgments might promote inferior social outcomes (Greene, 2014).  
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One approach to explaining why moral intuitions often align with deontology comes 
from mutualistic partner choice models of the evolution of morality. These models posit a 
cooperation market such that agents who can be relied upon to act in a mutually beneficial way 
are more likely to be chosen as cooperation partners, thus increasing their own fitness 
(Alexander, 1987; Baumard, André, & Sperber, 2013; Krebs, 2008; Noë & Hammerstein, 
1994; Trivers, 1971). People tend to select the most cooperative individuals as partners, and 
those who contribute less than others are gradually left out of cooperative exchanges (e.g. 
Barclay, 2004, 2006; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2011). To the extent that individuals who make 
certain types of moral judgments are favored in a cooperative market because these judgments 
signal a commitment to cooperation, so too will these judgments come to be favored as defaults. 
In other words, deontological moral intuitions may represent an evolutionarily prescribed prior 
that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. Why might deontologists be 
preferred as social partners? Two features of deontological intuitions seem important, given 
their relevance for social exchange: the prohibition of certain acts or behaviours, and the 
expression of socially valued emotional responses.  
First, deontologists’ prohibition of certain acts or behaviours may serve as a relevant 
cue for inferring trustworthiness because the extent to which someone claims to follow rule or 
action-based judgments may be associated with the reliability of their moral behavior. One 
piece of preliminary evidence for this comes from a study showing that agents willing to punish 
third parties who violate fairness principles are trusted more, and actually are more trustworthy 
(Jordan, Bloom, & Rand, in press). Moreover, the typical deontological reason for why specific 
actions are wrong is that they violate duties to respect persons and honor social obligations - 
features that are crucial when selecting a social partner.  An individual who claims that stealing 
is always morally wrong and believes themselves morally obligated to act in accordance with 
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this duty, seems much less likely to steal from me than an individual who believes that the 
stealing is sometimes morally acceptable depending on the consequences. Actors who express 
characteristically deontological judgments may therefore be preferred to those expressing 
consequentialist judgments because these judgments may be more reliable indicators of stable 
cooperative behaviour. Consistent with this, recent research has shown that, compared to 
people who make consequentialist arguments, people who make deontological arguments are 
perceived by others as less self-interested and as expressing more moral views (Kreps & 
Monin, 2014). And recent theoretical work has demonstrated that “cooperating without 
looking” – i.e., without considering the costs and benefits of cooperation – is a subgame perfect 
equilibrium (Hoffman, Yoeli, & Nowak, 2015). Therefore, expressing characteristically 
deontological judgments could constitute a behavior that enhances individual fitness in a 
cooperation market because these judgments are seen as reliable indicators of a specific valued 
behavior – cooperation. 
Second, deontological judgments often align more strongly with socially valued 
emotional responses, such as empathy and harm aversion, than do consequentialist judgments. 
As some have argued, making consequentialist judgments generally involves the suppression 
of prepotent (deontological-leaning) emotional responses in order to reach a more calculated 
analysis of the consequences to be derived from various actions (Greene, 2014). Research 
shows that characteristically deontological judgments are positively associated with harm 
aversion, and negatively associated with antisocial personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; 
Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012; Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015). 
People who are more likely to endorse the sacrifice of one person to save many others appear 
also to be those people who are less averse to harming others in everyday contexts where there 
is no obvious greater good (Kahane et al., 2015). If prospective partners in the cooperation 
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market intuit this, they may prefer deontologists. In other words, expressing a deontological 
judgment may communicate that a person has a set of socially valued emotional responses (i.e., 
an aversion to directly harming others) that make them an attractive social partner. Consistent 
with this, recent studies have shown that individuals who made deontological decisions in 
moral dilemmas are rated as being more empathic and having a superior moral character 




On both theoretical and empirical grounds it seems plausible that deontological moral 
intuitions may have been selected for through partner choice mechanisms.  However, the 
central claims behind this account – that people who express deontological moral intuitions are 
perceived as more trustworthy and favored as cooperation partners – has not been empirically 
investigated. In this paper we fill this gap, asking first whether deontological agents are 
preferred as social partners, and, if so, which features of characteristically deontological moral 
intuitions confer greater selective social value.  
In order to do so, across five experiments we examined participants’ perceptions of an 
agent who made either characteristically deontological judgments (“killing people is just 
wrong, even if it has good consequences”) or consequentialist judgments (“it is better to save 
five lives rather than one”). Following the bulk of previous research on moral intuitions, we 
used hypothetical sacrificial dilemmas as a way of directly pitting deontological and 
consequentialist intuitions against one another. In addition, we used several different dilemmas 
(some in which intuitions lean deontological; and some in which intuitions lean 
consequentialist) and complementary measures of perceived prosociality (self-reported 
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character ratings of morality and trust; behavioral data from economic games; and partner 
choice questions inspired by evolutionary biology) to test our hypotheses.  
 
Study 1 
We first investigated individuals’ perceptions of agents who made either deontological 
or consequentialist judgments in a sacrificial dilemma that typically evokes deontological 
intuitions in most respondents  (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Participants were presented with information about two 
agents who were asked to judge whether it was morally appropriate to push a man off a 
footbridge to stop an oncoming train from hitting five others, thereby killing him but saving 
the five. The consequentialist agent judged it morally appropriate to push the man, while the 
deontological agent did not. We then had our participants rate the morality and trustworthiness 
of each agent on a scale (Study 1a), play a hypothetical trust game with the agents (Study 1b), 




Ethics Note. All the studies reported in this manuscript received approval from the 
UCL Research Ethics Committee (4418/002) and the University of Oxford Central University 
Research Ethics Committee (MS-IDREC-C1-2015-098). 
Participants. 200 American participants (71 female; Mage = 34, SD = 10.69) were 
recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), and were paid $0.80 for their time. Five 
participants took the survey more than once, and so were excluded from subsequent analyses 
(final N = 195). For all studies reported in this manuscript, we used G*Power 3.1 (Faul, 
INTUITIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS AND PARTNER CHOICE 
  
8 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) to calculate the minimum sample size needed. This power 
analysis showed that a within-subjects design with a conservative small effect size (d=0.2) 
would require a minimum sample of 199 participants.  
Design.  Participants were told that they would be randomly paired with two other 
MTurk workers who had already completed the survey, and that they would see the other 
workers’ judgment along with their reasons for their judgment to the following moral dilemma 
(the footbridge Dilemma: Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976): 
 
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workers who will all be killed 
if the trolley proceeds on its present course. Adam is on a footbridge over the tracks, in 
between the approaching trolley and the five workers. Next to him on this footbridge is 
a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to save the lives of the five 
workers is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large 
body will stop the trolley. The stranger will die if Adam does this, but the five workers 
will be saved.  
 
Participants were then presented with the judgments of the two other workers (i.e. 
“Person A said that Adam should [not] push the large man to save the five workers”) and the 
reasons they gave for their judgment (i.e., “it is better to save five lives rather than one” vs. 
“killing people is just wrong, even if it has good consequences”). Half of the participants first 
read about the agent who endorsed pushing the large man (the consequentialist agent) then read 
about the agent who rejected the sacrifice (the deontological agent). This order was reversed 
for the other half of participants. After reading the responses of both agents, participants 
participants were asked to rate perceived morality (1 = extremely immoral / bad; 7 = extremely 
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moral / good) and perceived trust (1 = extremely untrustworthy; 7 = extremely trustworthy) of 
the two agents in the order in which they were presented. At the end of the study participants 
were asked to make their own judgment about whether they thought Adam should push the 
stranger (Yes or No), and how wrong it would be for Adam to push the stranger (1 = not at all 
wrong, 7 = very wrong). 
 
Results and Discussion 
In line with previous research, only a minority of participants (29%) endorsed the 
consequentialist option, with most participants (72%) indicating that it would be wrong to push 
the large man even if it would save five lives. 
 Because the data were non-normally distributed, we used a series of Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank tests. In line with predictions, the agent who gave a deontological response was perceived 
as being more moral (Z=-8.31, p<.001, d=1.1) and more trustworthy (Z=-8.13, p<.001, d=1.07) 
than the agent who gave a consequentialist response.  
We next investigated whether these results merely reflected a similarity effect whereby 
individuals simply prefer those who make similar judgments to them. If so, the observed overall 
preference for deontologist agents would be a result of the fact that most participants 
themselves made deontological judgments in the footbridge dilemma. However, the data did 
not support a mere similarity effect: our results were robust to controlling for participants’ own 
moral judgments such that participants who made a deontological judgment (the majority) 
strongly preferred a deontological agent, while participants who made a consequentialist 
judgment (the minority) showed no preference between the two agents either on perceived 
morality (Z=-0.78, p=.44, d=0.07) or trustworthiness (Z=-0.24, p=.81, d=0.04). We also 
conducted analyses looking at only people who either said that the consequentialist was “not 
INTUITIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS AND PARTNER CHOICE 
  
10 
at all wrong” or “very wrong” (points 1 and 7 on the wrongness scale respectively). Again, 
while people who said the consequentialist action was “very wrong” thought the deontological 
agent more moral and trustworthy, those who said the consequentialist action was “not at all 
wrong” perceived no difference between the two agents in morality (Z=-0.65, p=.52) or 
trustworthiness (Z=-0.95, p=.34). In the interest of brevity we only report the main control 
analyses in the main text. Please see the Supplementary Materials for full Ms, SDs, and 
significance tests for analyses broken down by participant judgment for all the studies reported 




Participants. 360 American participants (114 female; Mage=37, SD=11.97) were 
recruited through MTurk and paid $1.00. Participants were excluded from analyses if they did 
not complete the survey fully (N=3), failed simple comprehension checks involving the 
structure of the trust game  (N=74), took the survey more than once  (N=10), or had taken part 
in Study 1a  (N=54), leaving a final sample of 219 participants.  
 Design.  Study 1b used the same basic design as Study 1a, but with the addition of a 
new dependent measure—in addition to the character and trustworthiness ratings, participants 
played a trust game (TG) with the deontological and consequentialist agents. In a typical TG, 
there are two players: an investor and a trustee. The investor is given some money and told that 
they may send a proportion (from zero to the full amount) of this money to the trustee, and that 
the experimenter will multiply the money sent by some amount. Once the trustee receives the 
money, they are told that they may send back a portion of it to the investor, again ranging from 
zero to the full amount. In this study (and all subsequent ones), participants always played the 
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role of investor. The amount of money participants transferred to the agent (from  ($0.00 to 
$0.30) was used as an indicator of trustworthiness, as was how much money they believed they 
would receive back from the agent (0% - 100%). Finally, as an explicit measure of partner 
choice we asked participants to indicate “If you had a choice and could select one of the other 
people from earlier in this study (Person A or Person B), which one would you rather have in 
this game with you? Would you rather play with Person A or Person B?” 
 
Results and Discussion 
As in previous research, most participants (73%) endorsed the characteristically 
deontological judgment and indicated that it would be wrong to push the large man even if it 
would save five lives. And consistent with Study 1a, participants reported the deontological 
agent to be more moral (Z=-8.90, p<.001, d=1.10 Fig. 1A) and more trustworthy (Z=-8.70, p < 
.001, d=1.05; Fig. 1B; see Supplementary Tables 1-2 for Ms and SDs) than the consequentialist 
agent. Furthermore, participants transferred more money to deontological agents (63% of 
endowment) than consequentialist agents (40%: Z=-7.74, p<.001, d=0.73; Fig. 1C) and 
believed that deontological agents (43%) would return more money than consequentialist 
agents (24%: Z=-7.19, p<.001, d=0.73; Fig. 1D). As predicted, there was also a significant 
difference in preferred partner (p<.001), with 80% of participants preferring to play a trust 
game with an agent who made a deontological judgment. 
Again, these results held when controlling for participants’ own judgments. While 
deontological participants showed a strong preference for the deontological agent, 
consequentialist participants reported no difference in perceived morality (Z=-0.03, p=.98, 
d=0.07) or trust (Z=-0.27, p=.79, d=0.03,) of the two agents, and transferred the same amount 
to both agents (Z=-1.49, p=.14, d=0.27). Moreover, consequentialist participants actually 
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predicted that a deontologist agent would return more money than would a fellow 
consequentialist (Z =-2.02, p =.04, d=0.34). As in Study 1a, we next focused at participants 
who gave extreme responses on the wrongness scale. Again, while people who said the 
consequentialist action was “very wrong” transferred more to the deontological agent, those 
few who said the consequentialist action was “not at all wrong” showed no difference in the 
amount of money they transferred (Z=-0.03, p=.98) or predicted returns (Z=-0.06, p=.96); 
though they did perceive the utilitarian agent to be more moral (Z =-2.12, p=.03). Most 
convincingly, a full 35% of participants who thought the consequentialist action was “not at all 
wrong” indicated they would have preferred to play with a deontologist partner (compared to 
just 6% of those who said it was “very wrong” saying they would prefer a consequentialist 
agent). As in Study 1a, these results cannot be explained simply through participants distrusting 
those who disagree with them on moral issues - the majority of participants preferred the 
deontologist agent, and even the minority that endorsed a consequentialist position showed no 
consistent preference for either agent.  
 
Study 1c 
Two potential limitations of the studies thus far, however, deserve consideration.  First, 
it could be argued that because the responses in the TG in Studies 1a-b were only hypothetical, 
it is not clear whether participants would show differential responses to a consequentialist or 
deontological target in a TG with real monetary incentives. Second, it could be argued that 
demand characteristics might play a role given the within-subjects design of the previous 
studies - people might have believed that the experimenters expected them to respond 
differently to the consequentialist and deontological target because we asked them about both. 
To address these potential concerns, in Study 1c we sought to replicate the findings of Studies 
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Participants. 190 American participants (55 female; Mage=34, SD=11.11) were 
recruited through MTurk and paid $0.50. In this and subsequent studies, participants could only 
complete the survey in full if they answered simple comprehension checks at the start of the 
survey correctly. Participants were excluded from analyses if they took the survey more than 
once, or had participated in one of the previous studies reported in this paper (N=46), leaving 
a final sample of 144 participants. Again, most participants endorsed the deontological option 
(72%). In this study and all others involving real TGs in the manuscript, participants were paid 
bonuses according to the average amount returned by actual deontologist and consequentialist 
agents. 
 Design.  In Study 1c we followed the design of the two previous studies, but instead of 
having participants play a hypothetical TG with two agents (one agent who made a 
consequentialist judgment, and one who made a deontological judgment), participants played 
a real incentivized TG in a between-subjects design, so that they interacted only with one agent 
who either endorsed the deontological or consequentialist action. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Data were non-normally distributed and so we tested our hypotheses using Mann-
Whitney U tests. Consistent with our predictions, participants transferred more money to 
deontological agents (59%) than consequentialist agents (40%: U=1952, p=.01, d=0.46) and 
predicted that deontological agents would return more money (28%) than consequentialist 
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agents (21%: U=2099, p=.05, d=0.26). As predicted, there was a significant difference in 
preferred partner, p<.001, with 74% of participants preferring to play a trust game with an 
agent who made a deontological judgment.  
As before, results held when controlling for participants’ own moral judgments. 
Deontologist participants, again, showed a strong preference for the deontologist agent, and 
consequentialist participants showed no preference between either agent in transfer amounts 
(U=160, p=.42, d=0.25) or predicted returns (U=173, p=.67, d=0.13). We were unable to 
conduct analyses separately for those who endorsed the end-points of the wrongness scale 




Studies 1a-c demonstrated that people perceive agents who provide deontological 
responses to a sacrificial moral dilemma (compared to those who provide consequentialist 
responses) as more trustworthy, both in their self-reports and in their actual behavior. Yet it 
remains unclear whether this preference results from deontological judgments signaling a 
commitment to cooperation, or from consequentialist judgments indicating a reduced 
commitment to cooperation. These two potential explanations can be teased apart when using 
process dissociation, a technique that can assess the degree to which individuals’ responses are 
driven by being high or low in deontology or by being high or low in consequentialism 
(Conway & Gawronski, 2013). In Study 2 we attempted to similarly tease apart these 
possibilities, by investigating whether it is the presence of deontological intuitions that is 
crucial for inferring trustworthiness, or the absence of consequentialist intuitions. 
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We reasoned that if deontological agents are preferred over consequentialist agents 
because they are perceived as more committed to social cooperation, such preferences should 
be lessened if consequentialist agents reported their judgments as being very difficult to make, 
indicating some level of commitment to cooperation (Critcher, Inbar, & Pizarro, 2013). From 
the process dissociation perspective (Conway & Gawronski, 2013), a person who reports that 
it is easy to make a characteristically consequentialist judgment can be interpreted as being 
high in consequentialism (because they endorsed the sacrifice) but low in deontology (because 
there was little decision conflict with competing deontological motives). In contrast, a person 
who reports it is difficult to make the consequentialist judgment can be interpreted as being 
high on both consequentialism (because they endorsed the sacrifice) and deontology (because 
there was decision conflict with simultaneous deontological intuitions to not endorse the 
sacrifice). To the extent that it is the presence of deontological intuitions that is crucial for 
inferring trustworthiness, the preference for a deontologist over a consequentialist agent should 
be lessened when the consequentialist agent reports difficulty in making the judgment. In those 
cases, the conflict is indicating that the consequentialist agent has deontological intuitions that 
are making their decision difficult. In contrast, to the extent that it is really the absence of 
consequentialist intuitions that drive the preference for deontologists, participants should prefer 
a deontologist who reports ease in making the decision over one who reports it as difficult – 
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 Participants. 300 American participants (327 female; Mage=34, SD=10.86) were 
recruited through MTurk and paid $0.50. Participants were excluded from analyses if they took 
the survey more than once (N=8), leaving a final sample of 292 participants.  
Design. This study had a 2 (Target Judgment: Deontological vs. Consequentialist) x 2 
(Difficulty of Judgment: Easy vs. Difficult) between-subjects design. As in previous studies, 
participants played a TG with a target who gave a deontological or consequentialist response 
to a sacrificial moral dilemma, but in this study we added information that the target reported 
that their judgment was either “very difficult” or “very easy” to make. 
The dependent measures in this study were identical to those used previously, with the 
additional inclusion of a partner preference question that asked participants to rank with which 
of four agents they would have preferred to play the trust game if they had been given a choice: 
an agent who gave either a deontological or consequentialist response, and who reported that 
their response was either a difficult or easy to make. The person the participant reported they 
would have most preferred to play with was scored as “1,” and the person they would have 
least preferred to play with was scored as “4.”  
Because we were interested in whether there was an interaction effect between target 
judgment (deontological; consequentialist) and reported difficulty and because there is no 
standardized way of measuring interaction effects for non-parametric data, we used a square 
root function to transform the data and then ran a parametric ANOVA test to obtain an 
interaction effect to complement the main non-parametric simple contrasts. We report both the 
simple non-parametric contrasts and the parametric ANOVA results.  
 
Results and Discussion 
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Character Judgments. As in Study 1, deontologists were rated as more moral overall 
(F(1,288)=131.24, p<.001). As predicted there was a significant interaction between agent and 
choice difficulty (F(1,288)=13.42, p<.001) such that consequentialists were judged less 
negatively if they reported that the moral decision was difficult  (U=1612, p<.001, d=0.55: 
t(135)=2.96, p=.04). In contrast, choice difficulty for deontological agents did not have a 
significant effect on perceived morality (U=2480, p=.07, d=0.29; t(153)=-1.73, p=.09). We 
obtained similar results for perceived trustworthiness. Deontologists were seen as more 
trustworthy overall (F(1,288)=67.83, p<.001) and there was a significant interaction between 
agent and choice difficulty (F(1,288)=5.71, p=.02). While the means were in the expected 
direction, however, the simple effect of consequentialists being trusted more if the agent 
reported difficulty in making the decision was not significant (U=1979, p=.10, d=0.31: 
t(135)=1.80, p =.07). As before, reported decision difficulty had no significant effect on 
perceived trust of deontological agents (U=2501, p=.09; d=0.25, t(153)=-1.54, p=.13), and the 
means were in the direction of deontologist agents being trusted more if they said the decision 
was easy. Finally, results held when controlling for participants’ own judgments. 
Consequentialists and deontologists perceived the deontologist agent to be more moral 
(U=429, p<.001) and trustworthy (U=547, p=.03). Overall, then, self-report data supported the 
claim that preference for deontologists is driven more by the presence of deontological 
intuitions, rather than the absence of consequentialist intuitions.  
 Trust Game. Behavioral measures of trust indicated that across both difficulty 
conditions the deontological agent received higher transfers than a consequentialist one 
(U=8846, p=.009, d=0.31; F(1,288)=7.22, p=.008), and was expected to return more  
(U=8313, p<.001, d=0.38; F(1,288)=9.80, p=.002). However, while the means were in the 
expected direction, there were no significant interaction effects with reported difficulty of the 
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decision, either for transfer amounts (F(1,288)=0.12, p=.73) or predicted returns  
(F(1,288)=1.05, p=.31). Again, results held when controlling for participant judgment. 
Participants who made a deontological judgment both transferred more to, and predicted more 
to be returned from, a deontologist agent, while participants who made consequentialist 
judgments showed no differences in either transfer amounts (U=737, p=.80, d=0.04) or 
predicted returns (U=701, p = .54, d=0.13) towards the two agents.  
It is intriguing that a discrepancy arose between the self-reported and behavioural 
results: while participants’ self-reported data showed an interaction effect of the judgment and 
difficulty, behavioural data revealed significant main effects of the judgment only (though 
means were in the expected direction). It is unclear whether this is due to behavioural measures 
being noisier, or whether this represents a real distinction between behavioural and self-
reported judgments in this domain. Nonetheless, that there was this discrepancy provides 
further support for part of the motivation of this paper: to explore preferences for deontologists 
using actual behaviour and not just self-report judgments. 
Partner Choice. When choosing between agents who responded with either 
consequentialist or deontological judgments, the majority of participants preferred to play with 
an agent who reported a deontological judgment (70%, p<.001). Moreover, when asked to rank 
their preferences for playing with four potential partners (who gave either a deontological or 
consequentialist response, and for whom the judgment was either difficult or easy), significant 
differences in the rankings emerged (Friedman’s test: χ2 (3)=62.47, p<.001). Specifically, 
participants provided higher rankings on average to deontological agents compared to 
consequentialist agents, but this preference was mitigated if the consequentialist agent reported 
difficulty in making the decision (Z=4.21, p<.001) (Figure 2). Results held when controlling 
for participant judgment such that deontologist participants preferred to play with a 
INTUITIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS AND PARTNER CHOICE 
  
19 





Results from Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that people who make characteristically 
deontological judgments in the footbridge dilemma are seen as more trustworthy social 
partners, consistent with a partner choice account of moral intuitions. But might our results 
thus far depend on specific characteristics of the footbridge dilemma? This dilemma has one 
important potential limitation relevant for partner choice – sacrificing one to save many 
involves an act of violent assault: pushing a man off a bridge. It is plausible, therefore, that our 
observed preference for deontologists is driven solely because this dilemma highlights the 
possibility that deontologists are simply more averse to physical harm, and not necessarily that 
they are more reliable cooperators. To rule out the possibility that the preference for 
deontologists we have observed in the previous studies is merely a preference for agents who 
do not commit physical assault, rather than a preference for agents who espouse a deontological 
morality, we sought to replicate our initial findings using a dilemma in which the sacrificial 
action does not require physical assault:   
 
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workers who will all be killed 
if the trolley proceeds on its present course. Adam is on a footbridge over the tracks, in 
between the approaching trolley and the five workers. Next to him on this footbridge is 
a stranger who happens to be very large. The only way to save the lives of the five 
workers is to flip a switch to release a trapdoor that will drop the stranger off the bridge 
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and onto the tracks below where his large body will stop the trolley. The stranger will 
die if Adam does this, but the five workers will be saved.  
 
Note that the trapdoor case is identical to the footbridge case in all of its relevant 
structural features: the only difference is that Adam does not push the large man, but instead 
pushes a button that opens a trapdoor that causes the large man to fall onto the tracks. If the 
preference for the deontological agent in the footbridge is explained simply by an aversion to 
physical assault - rather than the consequentialist action per se - we should see no preference 
for a deontological agent in the trapdoor case. In contrast, if our claim that deontological 
judgments serve as signals of a cooperative nature is correct, we should find the same pattern 
we observed using the footbridge version: that overall, a person who makes a deontological 
judgment is perceived more positively than one who makes a consequentialist judgment. 
 
Method 
125 American participants (40 female; Mage=33, SD=10.17) were recruited through 
MTurk and paid $1.00. Participants were excluded from analyses if they took the survey more 
than once (N=9) or had participated in a previous study (N=16), leaving a final sample of 101 
participants. Most participants endorsed the deontological option (61%), but this difference 
was less pronounced compared to the footbridge case. The structure of this study was identical 
to that of Study 1b, with the same within-subjects design, dependent measures, and justification 
for the sacrificial action, but with the trapdoor dilemma instead of the footbridge dilemma. 
 
Results 
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 Results suggested that an aversion to agents who endorse physical assault cannot fully 
explain the preference observed for deontological over consequentialist agents. Participants 
rated the deontologist agent in the trapdoor dilemma as being more moral (Z=-5.41, p<.001, 
d=0.9) and trustworthy (Z=-4.61, p<.001, d=0.75) than a consequentialist one. Participants 
transferred more money to deontological agents (67%) than consequentialist agents (56%: Z=-
2.22, p=.03, d=0.30) and predicted that deontological agents (41%) would return more money 
than consequentialist agents (34%: Z=-2.63, p=.009, d=0.25). As predicted, there was a 
significant difference in preferred partner, p<.001, with 65% of participants preferring to play 
a trust game with an agent who made a deontological judgment. 
 As with the footbridge dilemma, these results held when controlling for participants’ 
own judgments. While deontological participants showed a strong preference for the 
deontological agent, consequentialist participants showed no preference between the two 
agents on perceived morality, (Z=-0.02, p=.99, d=0.02), trustworthiness (Z=-0.01, p=.99, 
d=0.07), transfers in the TG (Z=-1.42, p=.16, d=0.26), expected returns in the TG (Z=-0.86, 
p=.39, d=0.25), or partner choice (34%, p=.06). The same pattern was observed when looking 
at participants who endorsed either end-point on the wrongness scale, again confirming that 




Study 3 demonstrated that the preference for agents who made a deontological response 
in the footbridge dilemma cannot be explained purely due to an aversion to agents who 
physically harm others. In Study 4 we investigated an alternative explanation for why people 
prefer deontologists as social partners, testing whether this preference can be explained through 
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the notion of respecting persons and not treating them as ‘mere means’. A typical feature of 
deontological ethics is the notion of respect for individual persons (Kant, 1797/2002; Scanlon, 
1998), with corresponding implications for the acceptability of harm as a means to an end. On 
characteristically deontological approaches, it is morally wrong to use a person (e.g. holding 
slaves) as a mere means of acquiring some subjective end (e.g. to become wealthy) because to 
do so would deny the moral status of that person as a free and autonomous being. Relatedly, 
from a partner choice perspective one of the most fundamental ways of preserving a positive 
reputation in a cooperation market is to treat others as if they were persons with their own 
wishes, desires, and needs rather than mere objects to be used as necessary. Recall the 
footbridge and trapdoor dilemmas, where the death of the man occurs as an intended method 
(or means) to save the five others: the purpose of the large man being pushed or dropped is so 
that his body will stop the train. This use of someone merely as a means is part of what many 
deontological philosophers have claimed makes the action unacceptable, and seems consistent 
with commonsense moral intuitions. It may follow, then, that the use of others as mere means 
would also be undesirable in social partners.  
This intuition has been highlighted using yet another variant of the trolley case in which 
an individual is faced with the decision to sacrifice one to save many--the switch case. In this 
formulation, the lives of five workers are saved by diverting the trolley onto another track by 
pulling a switch: 
 
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workers who will all be killed 
if the trolley proceeds on its present course. Adam is standing next to a large switch 
that can divert the trolley onto a different track. The only way to save the lives of the 
five workers is to divert the trolley onto another track that only has one worker on it. If 
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Adam diverts the trolley onto the other track, this one worker will die, but the other five 
workers will be saved.  
 
The switch case differs from the footbridge case in two critical ways (e.g. Crockett, 
2013; Cushman, 2013; Greene et al., 2009). First, the harm in the footbridge case is direct and 
physical. We have already shown, in Study 3, that a mere aversion to agents who physically 
harm others cannot explain the preference for deontologists because deontological agents are 
also preferred in the trapdoor case where there is no direct physical violence. In Study 4 we 
exploited a second difference between the footbridge and switch cases – that of treating others 
as means to and end – to understand the preference for deontologist agents. Despite the general 
endorsement many people have that “ends do not justify means,” people do typically judge that 
sacrificing the one man by diverting the train is less morally wrong than sacrificing the man by 
using his body to stop the train (Foot, 1967; Greene et al., 2001). Such folk intuitions align 
with the Doctrine of Double Effect, which is based on the “distinction between what a man 
foresees as a result of his voluntary action and what, in the strict sense, he intends” (Foot, 
1967). On the doctrine of double effect, causing harm as a side effect of - but not a means to - 
bringing about a good outcome can be morally permissible. Indeed, aversion to violations of 
the doctrine of double effect might be an important driver of these differences in intuitions in 
the switch and footbridge cases (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013, 2014). Therefore, to explore 
whether our observed preference for deontological agents is sensitive to violations of the 
doctrine of double effect, in Study 4 we looked at partner preference in the switch case. 
To the extent that characteristically deontological judgments serve as cooperative 
signals because they indicate respect for persons, we would expect to see less negativity 
towards consequentialists in the switch case relative to the footbridge. This is because in the 
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footbridge case, the sacrificial action is performed with the intention of using the man’s body 
to save the others and thus involves using the man as a mere means rather than respecting him 
as a person. A reported unwillingness to use others as means to an end is likely to signal, 
therefore, that one is a more trustworthy social partner. But in the switch case, the sacrificial 
action does not so obviously involve violating the man’s autonomy by treating him as a mere 
means and so consequently should not signal as clearly that one is a more trustworthy social 
partner. Put simply, to the extent that people use judgments in moral dilemmas as indications 
of a person’s trustworthiness as a social partner, the preference observed so far for 
deontological over consequentialist agents should be substantially weaker – or non-existent – 
in cases where the deontological action does not so obviously involve respecting persons more 
than the consequentialist action. We tested this in both a within-subjects (Study 4a) and 
between-subjects (Study 4b) design. 
The switch case also enables us to test an alternative explanation for the observed 
preference for deontological agents: that people prefer as social partners those whose 
judgments accord with the majority view. In the cases tested thus far, the deontological 
judgment was also that endorsed by the majority of participants. However, in the switch case, 
the majority of participants endorsed the consequentialist agent and so if people simply prefer 
agents whose judgments reflect the majority view, then they should consistently prefer the 




Participants. 161 American participants (88 female; Mage=38, SD=13.06) were 
recruited through MTurk and paid $1.00. Participants were excluded from analyses if they took 
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the survey more than once  (N=7) or if they participated in one of the previous studies  (N=32), 
leaving a final sample of 122 participants. In line with predictions and previous research (and 
in contrast to our previous studies using the footbridge and trapdoor dilemma), a majority of 
participants (73%) endorsed the consequentialist option, with only a minority this time 
endorsing the deontological option (27%). 
 
Design. As in Study 3, the structure and dependent measures for this study were 
identical to that of Study 1b, but with the switch dilemma. 
 
Results 
Results showed that preferences for deontological over consequentialist agents largely 
depended on an aversion to agents who endorse using persons merely as a means, because these 
preferences disappeared when the sacrifice occurred as a side effect. In contrast to the previous 
studies, for the switch dilemma consequentialist agents were rated to be no less moral (Z=-
0.73, p=.47, d=0.10) or trustworthy (Z=-1.87, p=.06, d=0.26) than deontological agents. 
Consequentialist agents did not receive smaller transfers (59%) than deontological agents 
(53%: Z=-1.86, p=.06, d=0.17) and were not predicted to return less (37%) than deontological 
agents (34%: Z=-0.82, p=.41, d=0.10). Overall, participants showed no significant preference 
to play with either a consequentialist or deontologist agent (p=.09).  
Results broken down by participant judgment showed that, like the footbridge and 
trapdoor dilemmas, participants who made a deontologist judgment in the switch dilemma 
preferred partners who also made a deontologist judgment. In contrast to earlier studies, 
however, participants who made consequentialist judgment in the switch dilemma preferred 
consequentialist agents (see Supplementary Materials). This was the case whether using the 
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binary judgment or looking only at participants who endorsed the end-points on the wrongness 
scale. These results are in line with predictions such that in those cases where a consequentialist 
judgment does not clearly violate fairness-based principles about respecting others and not 
treating them as mere means, people do not infer that the agent is necessarily an untrustworthy 




750 American participants (327 female; Mage=34, SD=10.86) were recruited through 
MTurk in a 2 (Dilemma: footbridge vs. switch) x 2 (Agent Judgment: Deontological vs. 
Consequentialist) between-subjects design and paid $0.50. This was a direct replication of 
Study 1c, with the addition of the switch dilemma as a between-subjects factor. Sample size 
for the replication was determined by having 2.5 times the original sample size (Simonsohn, 
2015). Participants were excluded from analyses if they took the survey more than once 
(N=10), leaving a final sample of 740 participants. Replicating our earlier findings, the majority 
of participants given the footbridge dilemma gave a deontological response (70%), while in the 
switch dilemma these proportions reversed such that the majority gave a consequentialist 
response (72%). To test whether there was an interaction effect between dilemma and agent 
judgment, as in Study 2 we used a square root function to transform the data and then ran a 
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Character Judgments. We first looked at perceived morality. In line with predictions, 
there was a significant interaction effect between the dilemma and agent judgment (F(1, 
736)=58.40, p<.001), Participants perceived the deontological agent to be more moral than the 
consequentialist agent in both in the footbridge dilemma (U=5857, p<.001, d=1.42; t(375)=-
13.17, p <.001) and switch dilemma (U=14390, p=.03, d=0.23; t(361)=-2.17, p=.03), though 
the effect size was considerably greater in the footbridge dilemma. 
Similarly for perceived trust, in line with predictions there was a significant interaction 
effect between the dilemma and agent judgment (F(1, 736)=45.81, p<.001). Turning to the 
simple effects, we found that participants perceived the deontological agent to be more 
trustworthy in the footbridge dilemma (U=7993, p<.001, d=0.89; t(375)=-9.78, p<.001) but not 
the switch dilemma (U=16146, p=.73, d=0.05; t(361)=-0.62, p=.54).  
Trust Game. We next looked at behavior in the TG. As predicted there was a 
significant interaction effect between the dilemma and agent judgment on transfer amounts 
(F(1, 736)=6.44, p=.01). Breaking the interaction effect down, it was found that participants 
trusted the deontological agent more than the consequentialist agent in the footbridge dilemma 
(U=14906, p=.005, d=0.31; t(375)=-2.81, p<.005) but not the switch dilemma (U=15323, p = 
.24, d=0.13; t(361)=-0.80, p=.43) (see Figure 3.) 
For predicted returns, there was again a significant interaction effect between the 
dilemma and agent judgment (F(1, 736)=8.99, p<.003). Again, we found that participants 
predicted the deontological agent to return more than the consequentialist agent in the TG only 
for the footbridge dilemma (U=14449, p<.001, d=0.35; t(375)=-3.75, p<.001) but not for the 
switch dilemma (U=15896, p=.55, d=0.15; t(361)=-0.61, p=.54). 
Overall, results from the TG showed that participants perceived an agent who made a 
deontological judgment to be more trustworthy than a consequentialist agent (as indexed by 
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transfer amounts and predicted returns) only when the consequentialist agent endorsed treating 
others as mere means.  
Partner Choice. Results showed that overall, across both dilemmas there was no 
significant preference for either a deontological (53%) or consequentialist (47%) target. 
However breaking this down by dilemma type, we found that 70% of participants in the 
footbridge dilemma condition preferred to play with a deontologist target (p<.001), while this 
preference was reversed in the switch dilemma condition with 64% of participants preferring 
to play with a consequentialist target (p < .001).  
These results largely held when controlling for participants’ judgments. In line with 
results from Study 1, for the footbridge dilemma consequentialist participants perceived the 
deontologist agent to be more moral (U=1101, p=.005, d=0.55), and showed no difference in 
perceived trust (U=1282, p=.09, d=0.31), transfer amounts (U=1446, p=.46, d=0.12), or 
predicted returns (U=1563, p=.99, d=.04). Again, results cannot be attributed to participants 
simply preferring those who agree with them on moral problems. For the switch dilemma, 
consequentialist participants showed no difference in perceived morality (U=8511, p=.99, 
d=0.03) or trust (U=7606, p=.12, d=0.23), and while consequentialist participants did transfer 
more to a consequentialist agent (U=6896, p=.006, d=0.34), there was no difference in 
predicted returns (U=7843, p=.25, d=0.19) (see Supplementary Materials for all Ms, SDs, and 
significance tests). It is somewhat unclear why there was only a single effect of consequentialist 
participants trusting a consequentialist agent more in terms of transfers (but not rated trust or 
predicted returns), only in the between-subjects design (and not Study 4a). But nonetheless, 
the overall pattern of results is consistent with our predictions and the findings presented here 
in Studies 1-3. 
 




Results from Study 4 were consistent with deontological agents being preferred as 
social partners to the extent that such judgments honor implicit obligations to not treat others 
as mere means, suggesting that deontological judgments communicate trustworthiness. While 
deontological agents were preferred over a consequentialist agent when the (consequentialist-
endorsed) sacrificial act clearly involved using others as mere means (Studies 1-3), no such 
preference was observed when the (consequentialist-endorsed) sacrificial action was not 
strongly associated with using others instrumentally (Study 4). Furthermore, the fact that 
participants did not show a consistent tendency to perceive the consequentialist agent to be 
more trustworthy in the switch case – in which the majority response is to endorse the 
consequentialist sacrifice - demonstrates that the preferences for the deontological agent 
observed in Studies 1-3 do not reflect a mere preference for agents whose judgments accord 
with the majority view. 
 
Study 5a 
We have so far implicitly focused  (along with the vast majority of psychological work) 
on the deontological theory of Kant, who held that moral law consists of a set of maxims, or 
rules, that are categorical in nature, and that we are bound by duty to act in accordance with 
these categorical imperatives (Kant, 1797/2002). It is this (very simplified) Kantian view - 
whereby certain acts are intrinsically morally right or wrong - that predominates in the moral 
psychology literature when deontology is discussed. But this simplified account often ignores 
the critical roles of justice, duties, obligations, and rights that are central features of (neo-
)Kantian ethics. And we have already presented evidence that people might attend to these 
features when selecting social partners, whereby people strongly prefer agents whose moral 
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judgment does not violate the implicit duties we have to one another (Studies 1-3) but show no 
preference when a moral judgment doesn’t so obviously violate these duties or obligations 
(Study 4).  
But there are other deontological approaches that extend Kantian thinking: for example, 
those focusing on the idea of social contracts and the ways our actions can be justified to one 
another (Gauthier, 1986; Hobbes, 1668/1994; Parfit, 1984; Rawls, 1971; Scanlon, 1998).  Of 
particular interest is recent theoretical work that has argued for the evolution of a contractualist 
morality by partner choice mechanisms (Baumard & Sheskin, 2015). Moral contractualism is 
a non-consequentialist ethical theory developed by Scanlon (Scanlon, 1998), on which moral 
actions are those that would result if we were to make fair and binding agreements – i.e., social 
contracts - from a point of view that respects our equal moral importance as rational 
autonomous agents. Baumard and Sheshkin (2015) argue for a contractualist account of 
commonsense moral intuitions whereby people are likely to endorse a sacrificial action when 
such actions align with a principle of fairness (as in the switch dilemma), but reject a sacrificial 
action in most other cases, where such actions would violate implicit contractual obligations 
between persons  (as in the footbridge or trapdoor dilemmas). People do not seem to be 
intuitively applying consequentialist principles to these two dilemmas, and indeed as Scanlon 
himself wrote, “the implications of act utilitarianism are wildly at variance with firmly held 
moral convictions” (Scanlon, 1982). In the switch dilemma, all the individuals are on the train 
tracks and it is merely chance that the train is headed down one set of tracks. Given this element 
of chance, there is a sense in which all individuals have an equal right to be saved, and so to 
divert the train to save more people is a moral action entirely consistent with the mutualistic 
logic of partner choice. In contrast, pushing a stranger off a footbridge does not fit this model 
of fairness because there is no way in which the train would have gone onto the footbridge and 
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so the stranger was already safe from danger. Baumard and Sheshkin (2015) argue, therefore, 
that a simple and commonsense fairness principle respecting persons’ autonomy can explain 
the variance in moral intuitions across dilemmas: “When someone has something (e.g., safety 
from being in the potential path of a trolley), respect it; when people are on a par (e.g., they are 
all in the potential path of a trolley), then do not favor anyone in particular” (p.45). The 
contractualist account of Baumard and Sheskin is posited to explain why people typically 
endorse the sacrificial action in the switch, but not footbridge, dilemma.  
Partner choice mechanisms, then, may have selected for moral intuitions that are 
consistent with the demands of justice and our mutual obligations to one another 
(‘contractualist’) as opposed to those that draw solely on specific acts being wrong regardless 
of the context (‘categorical’). Consistent with this notion, results from Studies 2-4 suggest that 
it is the deontological feature of respecting persons and honoring social contracts, rather than 
committing to abstaining from specific actions per se, that signals trustworthiness – and this is 
consistent with the central feature being contract-based (as in Scanlon’s Contractualism) rather 
than merely rule-based (e.g. a very simplified categorical-based Kantian ethic). In Study 5 we 
sought to test this hypothesis directly. To the extent that evolution may have favored a 
specifically contractualist morality (c.f. (Baumard & Sheskin, 2015)), when a characteristically 
categorical-based judgment prohibiting a certain act conflicts with a characteristically 
contractualist judgment endorsing the same act, the agent who makes the contractualist 
decision should be seen as a more trustworthy social partner. 
We explored this in Study 5 using the so-called “soldier’s dilemma.” In this dilemma, 
a soldier is badly injured and caught in a trap, with the enemy fast approaching. The soldier 
cannot escape, and begs the troop leader not to leave him behind, as he will be cruelly tortured 
to death. Should the troop leader stab the soldier in the heart to prevent his suffering at the 
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hands of the enemy? In this dilemma, and in contrast to those previously used, it is the 
endorsement – rather than rejection - of the sacrificial action that is consistent with a 
contractualist deontological ethical analysis. Many people, if they were the fallen soldier, 
would want to be put out of their misery to prevent further suffering. Moreover, killing the 
soldier actually relieves his suffering and respects what the soldier himself wants. To the extent 
that partner choice mechanisms have promoted intuitive deontological judgments more along 
contractualist rather than categorical lines, participants should report a preference for agents 




150 American participants (72 female; Mage=33, SD=9.93) were recruited through 
MTurk and paid $0.50. Participants were excluded from analyses if they took the survey more 
than once (N=5), leaving a final sample of 145 participants. Study 5 used the same between-
subjects design and dependent measures as previous studies, but with the following dilemma: 
 
“Harry is the leader of a small group of soldiers, and all of the group is out of 
ammunition. Harry is on his way back from a completed mission deep in enemy 
territory when one of his men steps in a trap set by the enemy. The soldier's leg is badly 
injured and caught in the trap. Harry cannot free him from this trap without killing him. 
However, if Harry leaves the soldier behind, the enemy troops will find the soldier and 
torture him to death. The soldier begs Harry not to leave him behind to be cruelly 
tortured to death. The enemy troops are closing in on their position and it is not safe for 
Harry or his men to remain with the trapped comrade any longer. In order to prevent 
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this man’s needless suffering at the hands of the enemy, Harry could kill the soldier 
himself by stabbing him in the heart. Should Harry stab the soldier in the heart to 
prevent his suffering at the hands of the enemy?”    
 
 In this dilemma, participants were told that the agent who endorsed the sacrifice of the 
soldier justified their judgment by saying “it is acceptable to kill someone if it reduces their 
suffering”, while the agent who rejected the sacrifice justified their judgment by saying   
"killing people is just wrong, even if it has good consequences".  We refer to these as the 
contractualist and categorical agents respectively.  
 
Results 
In the soldier’s dilemma, only a minority of participants (25%) endorsed the 
categorical-deontological option and said it would be wrong to sacrifice the man, while the 
majority of participants endorsed the contractualist-deontological option by stating that it 
would be morally right to acquiesce to the soldier’s wishes and kill him (75%). 
Participants preferred agents whose judgments were consistent with a contractualist, 
rather than categorical, morality. In the TG, participants entrusted more money to a 
contractualist-deontological agent (64%) endorsing the sacrificial action (51%: U=2110, 
p=.04, d=0.33), and predicted this agent (37%) to return more back to them (28%: U=2073, 
p=.03, d=0.33), relative to the categorical-deontological agent condemning the sacrificial 
action (Figure 4). Moreover, most participants (59%) preferred to play with the contractualist 
agent over the categorical agent (p<.001). These results held when controlling for participant’s 
own judgments, whereby participants making the contractualist judgment trusted the 
contractualist agent more in terms of both transfer amounts (U=1128, p=.03, d=0.42) and 
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predicted returns (U=1019, p=.004, d=-0.55), while participants making the categorical 
judgment showed no preference between the two agents. Yet overall, character ratings were 
less consistent: while the contractualist and categorical agents were rated as equally trustworthy 
overall (U=2192, p=.08, d=0.28), the categorical agent was rated as more moral than the 




In Study 5a we found results consistent with the claim that individuals who make 
judgments that can be seen as honoring implicit social contracts and obligations to one another 
are preferred over those whose actions do not. There are, however, a few aspects of Study 5a 
that preclude drawing strong conclusions. Study 5b was designed to address ambiguities in the 
design of Study 5a, and as a secondary question, investigate whether participants attend more 
to agents’ justifications for a given action, or to agents’ endorsement of the action itself.  
The first potential problem with the design of Study 5a was that the specific action that 
the soldier himself wanted was potentially ambiguous. In the original dilemma, participants 
read that the “soldier begs Harry not to leave him behind to be cruelly tortured to death”. Given 
that the commander “cannot free him from this trap without killing him”, it is implicit that the 
course of action the soldier is advocating is a mercy-killing. However, if participants did not 
interpret it in this way, the claim that participants attend to whether an agent respects a person’s 
wishes and autonomy is weakened. Therefore, in Study 5b we made salient – and manipulated 
across conditions – what action the soldier himself wanted: in one condition he implored 
“Please, kill me. I don't want to suffer at the hands of torturers”, while in a second condition 
he said "Please, don't kill me. I don't want to die out here in the field”. Given that notions of 
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consent and respect for autonomy are central to deontological ethics – and exactly what one 
should seek in a social partner - the preference for the agent who endorsed the stabbing of the 
soldier should only be observed when the endorsed action aligns with the soldier’s injunctions.  
A second potential problem with Study 5a is that the justification to stab the soldier to 
prevent his suffering conflated both contractualist and consequentialist reasons. In Study 5a, 
the agent’s justification for the judgment that it would be morally right to stab the soldier was 
that it would reduce “their suffering”. But this is potentially ambiguous as an indication of a 
contractualist vs. a consequentialist style of thinking because both theories aim at reducing 
suffering. Put simply, it is not clear whether participants preferred the agent because their 
judgment was contractualist-consistent, or because they inferred consequentialist motives. The 
key difference between these two approaches is that consequentialist theories aim to maximize 
overall aggregate happiness, while contractualist theories focus more on specific individuals 
and the obligations we have to them in a given context. Aside from this, it remains to be seen 
whether participants are focusing more on the specific action endorsed (e.g. stab or not stab), 
or the justifications espoused for that action (e.g. respecting wishes vs. reducing overall 
suffering). Therefore, in Study 5b as well as manipulating whether the soldier gave consent we 
manipulated agents’ justifications for the action: one agent focused on relieving suffering, 
regardless of whether consent was given or not (consequentialist: “It is acceptable to kill 
someone if it reduces overall suffering”); one agent focused on killing being wrong, regardless 
of whether consent was given or not (categorical: "Killing people is just wrong, even if it has 
good consequences”); and two agents focused explicitly on autonomy and respecting the 
soldier’s wishes (contractualist: (“It’s right [wrong] to kill the soldier if that’s [not] what they 
want, and it’s the commander’s duty to respect that”). This enabled us to explore not only our 
primary question of whether people prefer agents who endorse acting in accordance with the 
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soldier’s wishes, but also a secondary question of whether participants attend primarily to the 
justifications or merely the endorsement of action. To the extent that people focus only on the 
action, we should see a preference for the agent who acts in accordance with the soldier’s 
wishes, regardless of the justification given. But to the extent that people are concerned with 
justifications, we should see a pattern whereby people prefer agents differentially based on 
their justification – even when they all endorse the same consent-conforming action. 
A final – and more minor – potential problem with Study 5a that we sought to correct 
is that in the original dilemma the soldier is presumed to be awake and conscious when he is 
stabbed, and this might invoke feelings of harm aversion in participants. Therefore, in Study 
5b we made it clear that the soldier would be unconscious by the time that he would be stabbed 
and so would not feel any immediate pain or suffering. 
   
Method 
454 American participants (185 female; Mage=34, SD=11.28) were recruited through 
MTurk and paid $0.70. Participants were given a modified version of the soldiers’ dilemma 
from Study 5a, where we manipulated whether the soldier asked to be killed or not in a 
between-subjects design. As a secondary manipulation, we varied the justification that the 
MTurker agent gave, such that participants believed they were playing with an agent who had 
read the dilemma and said that they thought the soldier either should or should not be sacrificed, 
and gave either a characteristically consequentialist, contractualist, or categorical-based 
justification (see Table 1). Therefore, this study had a 2 (Soldier’s Consent: Yes, No) x 3 (Agent 
Justification: consequentialist; contractualist; categorical) design. The dilemma was given as 
follows: 
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‘Harry is the leader of a small group of soldiers, and all of the group is out of 
ammunition. Harry is on his way back from a completed mission deep in enemy 
territory when one of his men steps in a trap set by the enemy. The soldier's leg is badly 
injured and caught in the trap. Harry cannot free him from this trap without killing him. 
The enemy is advancing and they will undoubtedly find the soldier and torture him to 
death. The enemy troops are closing in on their position and it is not safe for Harry or 
his men to remain with the trapped comrade any longer. Harry offers to stab the soldier 
in the heart after he's unconscious to kill him quickly and prevent him suffering at the 
hands of the torturers. Just before he passes out due the pain, the soldier pleads to Harry 
"Please, kill me. I don't want to suffer at the hands of torturers" ["Please, don't kill me. 
I don't want to die out here in the field"].’ 
 
Results 
The majority of participants reported that they thought the morally right action was the 
one that the soldier wanted (71%), highlighting the importance of consent and respecting 
wishes to participants’ own moral judgments. Breaking this down, when participants read that 
the soldier wanted to be killed, 88% indicated that they thought it morally right to stab the 
soldier, with this dropping to 44% for participants who read that the soldier asked not to be 
killed. Overall, then, while participants did appear to have intuitions along categorical lines 
(“killing is wrong”), their judgments were more in line with a respect-based contractualist 
analysis (“honor people’s autonomy and respect their wishes”). This replicates our finding 
from Study 5a that participants were more likely to say they endorsed the sacrifice, as well as 
suggesting this pattern was indeed driven by participants’ consideration of the soldier’s wishes 
(which were potentially ambiguous in Study 5a). 
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Did participants prefer agents whose moral judgments accorded with the soldier’s 
wishes? In line with predictions, results suggested that they did: Regardless of whether the 
decision made was to sacrifice or not, participants preferred the agent who endorsed the action 
that conformed to the soldier’s wishes over those who endorsed the action that did not. Agents 
whose judgments conformed to the soldier’s wishes were rated as more moral 
(U=19348, p=.002) and trustworthy (U=17497, p<.001), and received higher transfers in the 
TG (U=20322, p=.01).  There were, however, no significant effects on predicted returns 
(U=20868, p=.08) or partner choice (p=.33), although the means went in the predicted 
direction.  
We next considered whether participants’ preferences for the agent who honored the 
soldier’s wishes depended on whether they themselves endorsed the action that the soldier 
wanted. Results showed that, for participants who themselves endorsed the action that violated 
the soldier’s wishes, there were no significant effects in the ratings of agents who either 
conformed to or violated the soldier’s wishes: on morality (U=1738, p=.28), trust (U=1746, 
p=.30), transfers (U=1896, p=.76), or predicted returns (U=1770, p=.35). However, for 
participants who themselves endorsed the action that the soldier wanted, there were significant 
differences in judgments of the agent: for morality (U=8405, p<.001), trust (U=7097, p<.001), 
transfers (U=9469, p=.002), and predicted returns (U=9472, p=.006). Such results parallel 
those found in the previous studies, where it is deontological participants – for whom notions 
of consent, respect and duty outweigh concerns based solely on maximizing happiness – who 
show a preference for other deontologists, while consequentialist participants show no such 
preference. Moreover, these results highlight that the critical feature does appear to be 
contractualist notions of consent and respect, rather than mere categorical concerns about 
INTUITIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS AND PARTNER CHOICE 
  
39 
specific actions being forbidden. As such, these results are consistent with evolution favoring 
moral intuitions more along contractualist than categorical lines. 
            Finally, we investigated the extent to which participants were concerned with the 
justifications that the agent gave. If the observed preference for deontologists is driven 
primarily by their endorsement of a favored action that honors consent and mutual obligations, 
we should see a preference for an agent who acts in accordance with the soldier’s wishes, 
regardless of the justification given. But if people are specifically concerned with deontological 
justifications, we should see a pattern whereby people prefer agents differentially based on 
their justification – even when they all endorse the same consent-conforming action. To this 
end, we first looked at the conforming cases where the agent endorsed the action that the soldier 
wanted (i.e. the consequentialist in the consent condition, the categorical in the non-consent 
condition, and the contractualist in both conditions). Results from a Kruskal-Wallis test 
suggested that when the action conformed with what the soldier explicitly asked for, 
participants did not judge agents differently based on the justifications given: for ratings of 
morality (H=5.52, p=.06), trust (H=0.49, p=.78), transfers (H=0.11, p=.95), or predicted 
returns (H=1.08, p=0.58). Put simply, as long as the agent’s judgment respected the soldier’s 
wishes, participants did not care much about the reasoning why. A different picture emerged 
for the non-conforming cases where the agent endorsed an action that the soldier explicitly did 
not want (i.e. the consequentialist agent in the non-consent condition, and the categorical agent 
in the consent condition). While there were no effects on behaviour in the trust game, 
participants judged that an agent who refused to sacrifice the soldier against his wishes (i.e. the 
categorical-consent condition) as significantly more moral (H=16.76, p<.001) and trustworthy 
(H=5.93, p=.02) than the agent who endorsed the sacrifice of the soldier against his wishes (i.e. 
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the consequentialist-non-consent condition). In other words, results indicated that participants 




 In Study 5 we explored more directly the features of deontological judgments that 
signal trustworthiness. The data provide further evidence that deontologists are preferred to the 
extent that they honor the social relationships we have with on another: social relationships 
that depend vitally on respect of consent, not treating others as mere means, and mutual duties. 
Results from Study 5b also speak against one potential interpretation of our earlier findings: 
that a preference for deontologists merely reflects a preference for agents whose judgments are 
consistent with those of the majority. We found, for example, that 88% of participants reported 
that when the soldier asked to be killed it would be morally right to sacrifice him – but still 
thought an agent who refused to sacrifice him in this case was more moral and trustworthy than 
an agent who endorsed the sacrifice. 
 
General Discussion 
Collectively our findings suggest that characteristically deontological judgments in 
sacrificial moral dilemmas are perceived as signals of trustworthiness to the extent that these 
judgments indicate respect for persons and commitment to social cooperation, thereby 
providing the first empirical evidence for a partner choice account of intuitive moral judgments. 
Across five studies we observed a general pattern whereby people who make deontological 
judgments are preferred as social partners, seemingly because these judgments involve respect 
for persons. Using several complementary methods from a range of disciplines, we show that 
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characteristically deontological judgments in sacrificial dilemmas enhanced an individual’s 
cooperative reputation and thus could be argued to improve their fitness in the cooperation 
market. In contrast, individuals making consequentialist judgments were seen as less moral and 
trustworthy, and thus devalued as social partners. This pattern of results cannot be explained 
merely as a function of people preferring those who make the majority moral decision, because 
this preference for the non-sacrificial agent was seen even when the majority view is to 
sacrifice. Nor can our results be explained by people simply preferring agents who express the 
same moral view as themselves: across all studies these results held even when controlling for 
participants’ own judgments.  Furthermore, we show that while this effect holds for agents who 
report the sorts of deontological judgments consistent with intuitive, commonsense morality, 
there are predictable exceptions to this pattern of results. When communicating that a 
consequentialist judgment was made with difficulty, negativity towards agents who made these 
judgments was reduced. And when a harmful action either did not blatantly violate implicit 
social contracts, or actually served to honor them, there was no preference for a deontologist 
over a consequentialist. Our research is consistent with previous claims that socially valued 
moral intuitions more closely approximate deontological ethics that focus on mutual 
obligations and implicit social contracts (Baumard & Sheskin, 2015). Notably, these results 
were consistent across a range of dependent measures borrowed from different disciplines: 
explicit self-report methods common to social psychological studies (character ratings of 
morality), behavioral data from economic games (the trust game), and partner choice questions 
inspired by evolutionary biology (partner preference decisions). That we observed convergent 
results using these varied measures across our studies lends confidence that characteristically 
deontological judgments increase one’s value as a social partner, with tangible effects both on 
social perception and behavior.  




Deontological Judgments as Signals of Trustworthiness 
These results are consistent with a partner choice account of moral intuitions in that 
they suggest that typically deontological judgments confer an adaptive function by increasing 
the likelihood of being chosen as a cooperation partner - and so deontological moral intuitions, 
as a form of ‘cooperating without looking’ (Hoffman et al., 2015) may represent an 
evolutionarily prescribed prior that was selected for through partner choice mechanisms. 
Importantly, while consistent with the findings that Uhlmann and colleagues (2013) reported—
that people generally perceive those who make consequentialist judgments to be less moral 
than those who make deontological judgments—we provided behavioural evidence of the sort 
that would be predicted by this account.  
The addition of behavioural measures also led to the finding that, while having 
substantial overlap, in some cases explicit character ratings and actual trust behavior diverged. 
While incentivized trust behavior in the TG supported our predictions across all studies, there 
were some exceptions for character ratings. In Study 4b, for example, character ratings were 
more positive for a deontological agent in both the footbridge and switch dilemma, but 
differences in actual trust behavior were only observed in the footbridge case. A similar 
divergence was observed in Study 5a, where participants’ behavior in the TG showed greater 
trust of the contractualist agent who endorsed the sacrifice of the solider, but self-report ratings 
of character indicated no differences between the two agents. It is unclear whether these 
findings are due to different psychological mechanisms guiding behaviour vs. explicit attitudes, 
whether behaviour might be seen as the “real” measure of trust, but individuals do not have 
explicit access to how they might act, or whether there is some other unknown explanation for 
these dissociations. What is clear is that these results highlight the importance of measuring 
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social behavior in addition to social perceptions, because the two do not always point in the 
same direction. 
Could expressing deontological judgments be perceived as a ‘signal’ of 
trustworthiness? Evolutionary biologists distinguish between two distinct mechanisms for the 
evolution of reliable signals: a signal can serve as an ‘index’ of some underlying quality, or a 
‘handicap’ that carries an associated cost (Smith & Harper, 2003). Which of these mechanisms 
might apply to the expression of characteristically deontological judgments? Supporting the 
indexing mechanism, deontological judgments are positively associated with physiological 
indices of harm aversion (Cushman et al., 2012) and negatively associated with antisocial 
personality traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Kahane et al., 2015; Koenigs, Kruepke, Zeier, & 
Newman, 2012). Moreover, it has been argued that deontological judgments reflect moral 
emotions (Greene, 2014), which enable people to make credible commitments to prosocial 
behaviors (Frank, 1988). Meanwhile, the handicap mechanism would require endorsement of 
deontology to carry some cost, and for this cost to be higher for selfish types than for 
trustworthy types. One possibility is that the rigidity of deontology renders its supporters more 
vulnerable to being branded as hypocrites, since it necessarily provides less ‘wiggle room’ for 
rationalizing defection than does consequentialism, which is more flexible. For a trustworthy 
agent who will never behave dishonestly, there is little cost to committing to a deontological 
morality that dictates “always be honest”. However, for an agent who will sometimes behave 
dishonestly when the benefits are sufficiently high, there is an obvious advantage to subscribing 
to a consequentialist morality that does not condemn dishonesty absolutely, because it opens 
possibilities for justifying dishonest behavior. Thus, a dishonest agent bears a higher risk of 
being branded a hypocrite when subscribing to a deontological morality, relative to a 
trustworthy agent. Future work could usefully address whether either of these signaling 
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explanations provide alternative explanations for the phenomenon of deontological intuitions.  
Finally, it is important to reiterate that our results focus on perceptions of 
trustworthiness, rather than measuring trustworthiness itself. Our results are, therefore, 
ambiguous as to whether people that make characteristically deontological judgments are in 
fact more trustworthy. While judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are reliably perceived as 
indicating trustworthiness, whether they do so or not in actuality is an open question and so 
this is a ripe topic for future research. 
 
Who Prefers Deontologists? 
The main hypotheses and discussion in this paper have focused on perceptions of agents 
making deontological and consequentialist agents independent of participants’ own judgments 
in the dilemma. The reason for this simple: to the extent that characteristically deontological 
judgments improve fitness in the cooperation market, it is not necessary that each and every 
person prefers an agent that makes a characteristically deontological judgment, but rather that 
ceteris paribus, an agent who makes characteristically deontological judgments will be trusted 
more overall by a given population. And indeed, in this work and previous work the evidence 
is that it is deontologists that are preferred overall. But to highlight why it is not necessary for 
our partner choice account that each and every individual person would favor a deontologist, a 
comparison with work on the religiosity and anti-atheist prejudice is useful. Because religious 
belief has been associated with large-scale cooperation and prosociality, religiosity has come 
to be viewed as a indicator of trustworthiness (Norenzayan et al., 2014) such that religious 
individuals are trusted more relative to their atheist counterparts by the general population, and 
that this effect is stronger when judged by other religious individuals (Gervais, Shariff, & 
Norenzayan, 2011). It is implausible that nonreligious people would consciously agree that 
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religious belief drives prosociality, for this would imply that they themselves are less 
moral.  Rather, partner preference in religiosity (like, we argue, characteristically deontological 
judgments) takes place primarily at an ultimate, rather than psychologically proximate, level, 
and it need not be evident in each and every person. In line with this, results were not driven 
simply by people disliking those who disagree with them: across studies deontologist agents 
were preferred by participants endorsing both deontologist and consequentialist judgments, in 
those cases where consequentialism-endorsing participants showed any preference at all.  
While there wasn’t a simple matching effect, one interesting finding to emerge is that 
consequentialist participants were less likely to show a consistent pattern of preference for  
deontologists. Why is this? One explanation is that these judgments are reflecting the sum of 
two kinds of preferences: a preference for those individuals who are like them, and a preference 
for deontologists. For participants who make deontological judgments, these preferences are 
aligned and are revealed as a strong preference for deontological agents; whereas for 
participants who make consequentialist judgments these preferences are in conflict and cancel 
each other out. A second explanation is that participants who make deontological judgments 
prefer other deontologists (and/or others who are like them), while participants who make 
consequentialist judgments are more impartial in their preferences. One might be tempted to 
argue for the second explanation because impartiality towards others is a central feature of 
consequentialism. However, previous work has shown that participants who make 
consequentialist judgments in sacrificial dilemmas like those used in the current study are 
decidedly not more impartial than participants who make deontological judgments (Kahane et 
al., 2015). This evidence, in addition to the large body of evidence that people show a similarity 
bias in their social judgments (Lydon, Jamieson, & Zanna, 1988), suggests that the first account 
– that of conflicting preferences – may be more likely. Nonetheless, it will be interesting for 
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future research to explore this more fully.   
 
Strengths and Limitations 
Is it a problem that we look at perceptions of agents who made moral judgments in 
hypothetical moral dilemmas that are somewhat removed from typical moral problems that 
people face in everyday life? We argue not, for two reasons. First, recall that the aim of this 
paper was to investigate partner choice as an ultimate mechanism describing why moral 
intuitions are characteristically deontological. Because the bulk of psychological research on 
moral intuitions has used hypothetical sacrificial dilemmas such as trolley problems, we 
adopted this methodology as a way of directly pitting deontological and consequentialist 
intuitions against one another – since in practice, deontological and consequentialist theories 
overlap heavily in terms of what actions they permit or forbid. Second, and just as importantly, 
it is critical to highlight that while the moral dilemmas may have been hypothetical, our 
dependent measures were definitely not. One of the central ways in which this work advances 
upon important prior work by Uhlmann and colleagues (2013) is in the recognition that 
character judgments do not always map directly onto behavior, which is why we used a 
behavioral economic methodology where participants made decisions concerning the 
allocation of real money that had real consequences on how much money they were paid for 
taking part in the study. Nonetheless, it would be interesting for future work to follow on from 
this by using other kinds of moral issues that evoke both deontological and consequentialist 
intuitions.  
Will deontologists always be preferred? The evidence presented here suggests that, in 
general, deontologists will be preferred as social partners, but with the caveat that this is in the 
very specific context of online economic games. In real life, people select a range of social 
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partners (e.g. a friend or romantic partner, but also professional relationships such as doctors 
or lawyers) and what we value most in others can vary as a function of what kind of relationship 
it is. What one values in a loved one (e.g. warmth) might not be the same things we look for in 
a lawyer (e.g. competence). Given this, it remains plausible that at least in some contexts, it 
will be consequentialist agents who will be preferred. It will be generative for future research 
to explore this in order to understand more deeply how partner choice models can explain moral 
intuitions in different contexts. 
 
Commonsense Psychology and Ethical Theories 
Our work offers a new perspective on the possibility of bridging normative ethical 
theories with empirical findings in moral psychology. Research on moral judgments in 
sacrificial moral dilemmas has often tried to explain – or justify – these judgments through the 
lenses of ethical theories such as Utilitarianism or a simplified categorical-based Kantian 
deontology. Yet this endeavor has met limited success, as laypeople’s’ judgments about 
endorsing or rejecting the sacrifice of one to save others bear little resemblance to the demands 
of these ethical theories (Kahane et al., 2015). Contra Utilitarianism, commonsense morality 
does not have the sole aim of maximizing aggregate welfare (Baumard et al., 2013), and contra 
very simplified forms of categorical-based Kantian ethics does not treat moral rules as 
absolutely binding (Kahane, 2015). Rather, commonsense morality appears to be pluralist, 
consisting of a variety of specific fairness and harm-based principles, where (like on some 
contractualist theories) sometimes it is permissible to overrule some specific deontic principle 
if following it would lead to great harm. One interesting implication of our work, therefore, is 
that researchers exploring how folk moral judgments align with normative ethical theories 
could usefully consider moral contractualism. To whit: it is unlikely that commonsense 
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intuitions will have a direct mapping onto the philosophical principles of moral contractualism 
or neo-Kantian ethical theories; but at the very least it seems describing commonsense morality 
along such contractualist-deontological principles will be less wrong. Our evolved 
commonsense morality is not utilitarian and not deontological in a simple Kantian-categorical 
sense, but with it’s focus on justice and fairness, it does share important features with 
contractualist moral theories (Baumard & Sheskin, 2015). Moral contractualism, in addition to 
aligning well with the moral judgments people typically make, may also help to inform why 
we make these judgments, and under what conditions these judgments can be defended from a 
normative standpoint - and we look forward to future empirical and theoretical work exploring 
this. 
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Figure 1. Agents who made deontological choices in the footbridge dilemma were rated as 
more moral (A) and trustworthy (B), and in a trust game received higher transfers (C), and 








































































































Figure 2. Expressions of choice conflict mitigate partner preferences for deontological agents. 
Participants strongly preferred deontological agents to consequentialist agents, but this 
preference was mitigated if the consequentialist agent reported difficulty in making the 




























Figure 3. Preference for deontological agents is sensitive to respecting persons and not treating 
others as mere means. In Study 4b, an agent who made a deontological judgment in the 



















Deontologist  Consequentialist  Deontologist  Consequentialist  














INTUITIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS AND PARTNER CHOICE 
  
57 




Consent Condition No-Consent Condition 
“Please, kill me. I don't want to suffer at 
the hands of torturers” 
"Please, don't kill me. I don't want to die 
out here in the field 
Consequentialist Endorses Sacrifice* Endorses Sacrifice 
 
“It is acceptable to kill someone if it 
reduces overall suffering” 
“It is acceptable to kill someone if it 
reduces overall suffering” 
Categorical-
Deontologist 
Rejects Sacrifice Rejects Sacrifice* 
 
“Killing people is just wrong, even if it 
has good consequences” 
“Killing people is just wrong, even if it 
has good consequences” 
Contractualist-
Deontologist 
Endorses Sacrifice* Rejects Sacrifice* 
 
“It’s right to kill the soldier if that’s 
what they want, and it’s the 
commander’s duty to respect that” 
"It is wrong to kill the soldier if that's not 
what they want, and it’s the 
commander’s duty to respect that." 
 
Note: * indicates a conforming cases where the agent’s judgment coheres with the soldier’s request. 
 
 
 
 
